In general the software on most cameras does not support this, but in theory it is definitely possible. The camera could directly encrypt the image with a public key and since it can only be decrypted with the private key, that could be held only by whoever needs to verify the images. For more details on what is meant by public and private keys, look up RSA Encryption and/or read https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Public-key_cryptography for a general overview.
People that hacked the NX300 firmware were able to get very close to this (only downside was that the image was still being written to the card once before being encrypted and deleted, a deeper knowledge of the firmware could change avoid the initial write).
https://sites.google.com/site/nxcryptophotography/
I am not aware of any commercial camera supporting a feature like this from the factory.
If the image is still meant to be viewable, then invisible sorts of signatures can be used (look up "steganography"), but in general these can still be manipulated. Some forms might be altered by manipulation, so there is some potential to detect inauthentic versions.
Itai's answer does mention an attempt at verification that Canon and Nikon made, but doesn't go into the details, and neither did the links. In the case of Nikon:
"ElcomSoft research shows that image metadata and image data are processed independently with a SHA-1 hash function. There are two 160-bit hash values produced, which are later encrypted with a secret (private) key by using an asymmetric RSA-1024 algorithm to create a digital signature. Two 1024-bit (128-byte) signatures are stored in EXIF MakerNote tag 0x0097 (Color Balance).
During validation, Nikon Image Authentication Software calculates two SHA-1 hashes from the same data, and uses the public key to verify the signature by decrypting stored values and comparing the result with newly calculated hash values.
The ultimate vulnerability is that the private (should-be-secret) cryptographic key is handled inappropriately, and can be extracted from camera. After obtaining the private key, it is possible to generate a digital signature value for any image, thus forging the Image Authentication System." -- https://blog.elcomsoft.com/2011/04/nikon-image-authentication-system-compromised/
So they commit the cardinal sin of cryptography, the private key really should not be on the camera, or if it is, it needs to itself be encrypted in a way that prevents extraction. This is of course quite difficult, and the private keys should probably be created/distributed by a channel completely independent of the camera. The method above for the NX300 would only require the public key to be on the camera, but has it's own downsides, like not having previews on camera (the image is encrypted and with no private key it can't be decrypted on the camera). Of course the camera could keep both the encrypted and never-encrypted version, in which case the never-encrypted one can be considered a sort of preview of the official authentic image, which is strictly speaking never seen until authenticated by decryption with the private key.
In the court case scenario this would mean that these private keys would need to be held by the courts, not be those taking the photos or that might deal with them along the way. In the case of photojournalism the private keys could be held by the editors or by independent regulatory bodies. From a marketing standpoint these are a bit difficult to set up, since these individuals and institutions would need to learn how to create private/public key pairs and to distribute the public keys and how people are meant to load the public key to their camera, and people would need to be storing a bunch of encrypted photos they're never going to see as 'just in case' evidence. In the IT space this sort of thing is common enough though, e.g. there are many tutorials on setting up these kinds of keys for SSH.
Edit1: Changed to not say the private key is used on the camera, I think it is not but is just stored there.
Edit2: The hashing approach they use is space saving, but even without the private key it may be possible to make edits to the photo that conform with the hashes in some constrained way.
digital-signatures
would be more useful. \$\endgroup\$